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THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 1950-1996: PEAKS AND DEPTHS
Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy*
On 26th January, 1950 the people of the ancient land of India, having just cast
off the foreign yoke, opted for parliamentary democracy and constituted themselves
into a Democratic Republic. In 1975, they exercised a further option to crystallise
the existing provisions to constitute India into a Socialist, Secular, Democratic
Republic. And, here we are today claiming to be the largest parliamentary democracy in the world and rightly proud of one of its pillars, the judiciary who, according
to my assessment, biased no doubt, have by and large, acquitted themselves far better
than the other two pillars, the legislature and the executive.
The founding fathers of the Indian Constitution with minds tuned to the west
were not unnaturally inspired by the three great western revolutions, the American,
the French and the Russian. The vibrant proclamations of "Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity" in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, the rhetoric of the
American Declaration ofIndependence that "we hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal", the trumpet call of the communist manifesto, the
document of faith of the Russian revolution "from each according to his ability, to
each according to his need" have thrilled millions of people and continue to echo
in their hearts to this day. Not surprisingly, the founding parents of our Constitution
too were moved by these ideals.
But as students of history and politics are well aware, the American and the
French revolutions were essentially the struggles of the bourgeoisie against feudalism and colonialism, while the Russian revolution was aimed at the overthrow of
the bourgeoisie by the proletariat.
The main theme of the American and the French revolutions was the freedom
of the individual. Freedom of contract and freedom of property were the other
primary rights with which they concerned themselves. Their claim to equality was
against the privileges enjoyed by the feudal and the colonial rulers. The basic social
theory was the protection of private property. A democracy of property owners
where there would be equal opportunity to acquire wealth was the goal. On the other
hand, the Russian revolution was inevitably directed against the institution of private
property and all forms of class inequality. State ownership of the means of
production was the immediate object. Liberty was the ultimate goal, leading to the
withering away of the state. The American and French revolutions on the one hand
and the Russian revolution on the other represented different ideologies which were
*
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necessarily not consistent, notwithstanding that the end of both was the creation of
a society in which were present the conditions necessary for the full development
of the human being and the dignity of man. Inspired as they were by ideologies from
different historical sources, the makers of the Indian Constitution produced a
document owing allegiance to different social philosophies. They sought to fashion
a Constitution on the bourgeoisie understanding of the ideals of Liberty and
Equality, but the revolutionaries that they were and pressed as they were by the force
of progress, they were alive to. the march of history and the significance of the
Russian socialist revolution and so they accommodated in some measure some
principles of socialism.
The result was the dichotomy of the Indian Constitution which projected
certain individual freedoms and rights as basic, and incorporated them in the
Constitution as 'Fundamental Rights' while relegating other significant rights which
incorporated socialist or humanist principles to the position of 'Directive Principles
of State Policy'. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly and
association, freedom of occupation, freedom of movement, right to life and liberty,
right to own and possess property, the right to practise one's own religion were
among the rights guaranteed as 'fundamental rights'. Apparently to appease the
apprehensions of the bourgeoisie some of these liberal rights were diluted and made
subject to reasonable restrictions and a sinister provision for preventive detention
was also incorporated. The right to approach the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights was itself guaranteed as a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court, was specially, invested with the power to issue writs and
directions to enforce fundamental rights (Art. 32), the power to entertain appeals
against orders of any court or tribunal (Art. 136) and the power to make any order
to do full justice between the parties (Art. 142). The full significance and extent of
the power under Art. 142 is yet to be explored. It is only recently that the Supreme
Court has discovered the enormity of the power vested in it under Art. 142 and
started asserting it in a guarded and limited way. The judicial evolutionary process
may be appreciated by referring to Re Vinay Chandra Mishra,l State of AP. v. S.
Viswanatha,2 N. A Mahammed Kasim v. Soluchana,3 Union Carbide Corporation
v. Union of India,4 Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction Co. (P)
Ltd.5 In the Union Carbide and Vinay Chandra Mishra's cases, the Supreme Court
appeared to swing the gates open by announcing that the power of the Supreme Court
under Art. 142 to do complete justice is entirely of a different level and different
quality, and any prohibition or restriction contained in ordinary laws cannot act as
a limitation on the constitutional power of the Court. The Supreme Court seemed
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to be of the view that the pOwer conferred by Art. 142 being a constitutional power,
the 'ordinary laws' made by Parliament and the State Legislatures must yield to it.
But then are not these 'ordinary laws' too made by constitutional empowerment! If
the law made by Parliament is constitutionally valid, should it yield to the power of
the Supreme Court to do complete justice between the parties under Art. 142? Should
the glorious uncertainty of judicial pronouncement on the 'complete justice' in an
individual case take precedence over the fair certainty of justice according to the law
enacted by the Legislature?
When we talk of the Rule of Law what do we have in mind, the certainty of
the statute or the uncertainty of the judicial mind! A further question which arises
is whether the 'complete justice between the parties' contemplated by Art. 142 of the
Constitution is 'law declared by the Supreme Court' within the meaning of that
expression in Art. 142? These are some of the questions which immediately come
to the mind and which have to be answered by the Supreme Court in some future
case and, fortunately, the last word is with the judges.
In Delhi Development Authority Justice Jeevan Reddy struck the right note and
referring to the observations in Vinay Chandra Mishra, said:
In other words, the power under Art. 142 is meant to supplement the existing
legal framework - to do complete justice between the parties - and not to
supplant it. It is conceived to meet situations which cannot be effectively and
appropriately tackled by the existing provisions of law. As a matter of fact, we
think it advisable to leave this power undefined and uncatalogued so that it
remains elastic enough to be moulded to suit the given situation. The very fact
that this power is conferred only upon this Court, and on no one else, is itself
an assurance that it will be used with due restraint and circumspection, keeping
in view the ultimate object of doing complete justice between the parties.
To continue the narrative, it will be noticed that fundamental rights such as the
freedom of speech and expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom
of movement, right of equality before the law, right to equal opportunity, right to
life and personal liberty, right to practise one's own religion etc., are essentially
rights of an individual character meant primarily to protect the citizen against
arbitrary state action. They are intended to foster the ideal of a liberal political
democracy and to prevent the establishment of authoritarian rule. It is also apparent
that these rights are ordinarily capable of enjoyment only by persons who are
generally free from want and need and of little significance to the hungry and
homeless. Even so and, undoubtedly, the importance of these rights cannot be
minimised. The events of the last half century in the East European countries and
elsewhere have demonstrated convincingly the great importance of these rights. In
our own country, the dark days of Emergency have shown us how near the brink of
despotism we were and how absolute authoritarianism had virtually deposed democracy. The emergency taught us how necessary it is to stimulatt: the interest of the
people of India in the fundamental rights which are vestt:o in them under the
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Constitution and how essential it is to strengthen the respect for the Rule of Law with
a fearless and independent judiciary with wide enough power to enforce the
fundamental rights for the benefit of the people.
However, the right to equality guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution and
the right to life guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution have, in recent years,
received expansive interpretation by the Supreme Court. Thanks primarily to the
pioneering efforts of my esteemed and dear friend, the one and only Justice V.R.
Krishna Iyer, the Supreme Court has by an interpretative process freed these rights
from the narrow confines to which they had been restricted earlier. I will refer to
this aspect later again.
Apart from the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution, other rights of
great human significance and importance such as the right to work, the right to an
adequate means of livelihood, the right to a living wage, the right to equal pay for
equal work, the right to share the material resources of the community, the right to
easy access to justice, which should have been made fundamental rights, have been
relegated by the Constitution makers to the position of Directive Principles which,
while announced to be fundamental in the governance of the country, are nevertheless emphasised to be unenforceable in a court of law. Other directive principles
enjoin the state to strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and
protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic
and political, shall inform all the institutions of national life. The directive principles
also require the state to direct its policies towards securing that the ownership and
control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to serve
the common good and that the operation of the economic system does not result in
the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.
The dichotomy of the Indian Constitution is also found in the great documents
of the United Nations. While Arts. 1 to 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights concern themselves with the traditional, basic freedoms, Arts. 22 to 28 are
concerned with social and economic rights. It was, however, decided that there
should be separate covenants for economic, social and cultural rights, and for civil
and political rights. Notwithstanding the recognition of traditional freedoms and
with them basic economic and social rights as 'human rights' by the Universal
Declaration and the two covenants, the Western Nations and the West-oriented
Human Rights Organisations continue to view human rights as meaning political
freedom and civil liberties.
The approach of the Supreme Court towards directive principles was cold
indeed in the beginning. Only, of late, it has warmed up a bit. That the directive
principles were stated not to be justiciable was sufficient for the judges to bestow
no more than a fleeting glance at them and to get wrapped up in the transcendentalism of the fundamental rights. In one of the early cases,6 the Supreme Court went
6
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so far as to say, the directive principles of State Policy have to confonn to and run
subsidiary to the chapter on Fundamental Rights. This was affirmed in Re Kerala
Education Bill. 19577 case with a small rider that the court may not entirely ignore
the directive principles of State Policy, but should adopt the principle of harmonious
construction to give effect both to fundamental rights and directive principles.
However, the attitude underwent a sea change in Keshavananda's8 case where the
Court upheld the validity of the first part of the 25th Constitutional Amendment
which gave immunity to laws aimed at securing the directive principles mentioned
in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39 of the Constitution from attack on the ground of
offending the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution.
However, in Minerva Mills,9 Chandrachud, C.J. struck down as unconstitutional that
part of the 42nd Amendment which purported to extend the immunity to all laws
made pursuant to any of the directive principles in Chapter IV of the Constitution.
The view of Chandrachud, C.J. was doubted by the present writer with P.N.
Bhagwati, E.S. Venkataramaiah and Baharul Islam, JJ. concurring in Sanjeev Coke
Company. 10 However, Justice Chandrachud's views on the place of directive principles vis-a-vis the fundamental rights in the Constitution are worth noting. In
Keshavananda Bharati, he said:
The Constitution accords a place of pride to fundamental rights and a place of
permanence to the directive principles ... that one is justiciable and the other
not, may show the intrinsic difficulties in making the latter enforceable through
legal processes, but that distinction does not bear on their relative importance
... the basic object of conferring, freedoms on individuals is the ultimate
achievement of the ideal set out in Part IV ... The freedoms of a few have then
to be abridged in order to ensure the freedom of all. It is in this sense that Part
III and Part IV as said by Granville Austin together constitute the 'conscience
of the Constitution.
In Minerva Mills, he said:
Part III and Part IV are like two wheels of a chariot, one no less important than
the other ... in other words, Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of
the balance between Parts III and IV ... This harmony and balance between
fundamental rights and the directive principles is an essential feature of the
basic structure of the Constitution.
To resume our story, it was the bourgeoisie which had led the revolutionary
forces to win independence for India and to fashion the Indian Constitution. After
independence, the bourgeoisie emerged as the ruling force. Still retaining as they did
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some of the characteristics as a revolutionary force, the new rules put an end to last
vestiges of feudalism in India by the enactment oflegislation abolishing Zamindaries
in the various states. Zamindars fought last ditch battles in courts against the
onslaught of the bourgeoisie but the rulers were quick to respond by bringing about
constitutional amendments, the First and Seventeenth Amendments to prevent any
challenges to those legislations by the Zamindars. The validity of the amendments
was upheld by the Supreme Court in Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India!!
and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan.! 2 The argument that Parliament had power
to amend the Constitution, including the right to abridge or take away a fundamental
right was upheld. Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh represented the triumph of the
bourgeoisie against feudalism. But later, when the interests of bourgeoisie land
owners were threatened by the imposition of ceilings on holdings of land, the
Supreme Court in Golaknath v. State of Punjab! 3 overruled Shankari Prasad and
Sajjan Singh and denied to Parliament the right to amend the Constitution to take
away or to abridge a fundamental right. Golaknath was a tragedy. The judges led
by Chief Justice Subba Rao, otherwise a great liberal judge, shows a'Marshallian
awareness' of the fundamental rights in the Constitution that they were expounding
but no perception of the directive principles which were also part of the Constitution. There was a flow of high-sounding rhetoric about the transcendental nature of
the fundamental rights, but hardly a thought for the 'People of India' mentioned in
the Preamble to the Constitution. That was to be expected. No 'indigenous' jurisprudence was in the making, and no judges had yet emerged, who were not stepped in
British Jurisprudence and who did not look to American jurisprudence for aid and
lead when British Jurisprudence did not provide it. Golaknath represented the high
water mark of the efforts of the bourgeoisie to entrench fundamental rights against
inroads by the directive principles. Though hailed by the elect and the elite, as soon
as the judgment was pronounced, the decision came under serious attack by lawyers,
legislators, academics and the sentient and the conscientious. After some years, the
mater was reconsidered by the Supreme Court in Keshavananda Bharati's case,
where a full court decided that Golaknath was wrongly decided. While conceding
to Parliament the power to amend, the court circumscribed that power by holding
that it could not be exercised so as to alter the basic structure of the Constitution.
And, the Court reserved to itself, the right to adjudicate upon every future amendment of the Constitution, whether it altered the basic structure or not. Since there
are no signposts signalling basic features of the Constitution, every attempt to
discover a basic feature becomes a 'voyage of discovery'. Chief Justice Sikri in
Keshavananda enumerated what he considered were some of the basic features of
the Constitution. Other judges in other cases have considered and decided upon some
basic features. Recently, in Bommai's case,!4 the Court has held secularism to be a
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basic feature of the Constitution. The Rule of Law,15 the independence of the
judiciary, judicial review, the separation of powers,16 the parliamentary system of
Government,11 free and fair elections,18 etc. have all been held to be basic features
of the Constitution. A list of some basic features as decided by Courts is found in
Justice Mohan's judgment in Bommai's case. The Court however, seems to be
hesitant to declare the basic social and economic policy, so profoundly propounded
in the Directive Principles of state policy as a basic feature. A different note was
however, struck in Sanjeeva's case.
Besides the First and the Seventeenth amendments which sought to protect the
Zamindari Abolition legislations, there were other important amendments also. In
fact, the First amendment itself contained several other provisions. As the Constitution stood originally, under Art. 29(2) no citizen could be denied admission into
any educational institution maintained by the state or receiving state aid on grounds
only of religion, race, caste or language. There was no saving clause. It was held by
the Supreme Court in Champakam Dorai Rajan's case that the community-wise
•distribution of admissions to the Medical College which had the effect of denying
admission to merited candidates of the Brahmin caste as against candidates of
inferior merit belonging to other castes was void because it offended Art. 29(2). As
it was thought that the judgment would adversely affect the educational advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, the Constitution was amended
by the First Amendment to enable the state to make special provision for the
advancement of socially and educationally backward classes and the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Even so the elitist classes consisting of the upper
castes of the caste-ridden Indian society have persistently and relentlessly questioned the policy of reservation in favour of the socially and educationally backward
classes. Much confusion was added by the judicial wisdom in M.R. Balaji v. State
of Mysore, 19R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, 20 etc. ending with Vasantakumar v.
State of Karnataka.20a
Just.as several legal battles were waged to preserve the right to property, so
are such legal battles being fought to preserve the 'meritarian' principle. The most
recent of the cases decided by the Supreme Court is that of [ndra Sawhney etc. v.
Union of [ndia21 in which Justice Jeevan Reddy, speaking for a Constitution Bench
of nine judges, recognising that social justice has to be based on social realities and
that caste is a naked, vexing fact of life in rural India, ruled that it was not
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unconstitutional to identify socially and educationally backward castes as socially
and educationally backward classes; they refused to identify backwardness exclusively with reference to economic criteria; they refused to accept the myth that
reservation was always and inevitably antimeritarian; they held that Art. 16(4) was
designed as an instrument for the sharing of power by the backward classes who had
till now been kept out of the apparatus of state power by the upper castes consisting
of a few communities who had almost exclusive monopoly of such state power. It
is, however, now clear that Indra Sawhney is not going to be the last word on the
subject. The elitist classes will now employ different tactics to destroy the reservation policy. One obvious tactic is to classify some of the elitist castes as backward,
so as to enable them to capture the benefits of reservation and to hike the percentage
of reservations perilously high limits. The Tamil Nadu legislature made a law raising
the percentage of reservation to 69% despite the limit of 50% prescribed by the
Supreme Court. All parties including those who were vehement in their criticism of
V.P. Singh's acceptance of the MandaI Report agreed to include the Tamil Nadu Act
in the IX Schedule. The Karnataka Government by an executive fiat included among
the Backward Classes castes which two commissions had refused to classify as·
backward. The percentage of reservation was raised to 80. The Andhra Pradesh
Government appointed a commission to go into the backwardness of certain castes
and fixed August 31 as the deadline for the report of the commission. Having done
that, the AP Government issued an order one week before the deadline including
those very castes among the backward classes. It remains to be seen how the courts
are going to meet these challenges so obviously politically motivated. In another
early case, Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,22 the Supreme Court decided that
freedom of speech and expression could not be restricted by any law except a law
directed solely against the "undermining of the security of the State" or its "overthrow". The effect of Romesh Thappar was sought to be undone by the First
Amendment which extended the scope of the restricting laws to "public order",
"incite to an offence", and "friendly relations with foreign states". But liberal minds
were appeased by bringing in judicial review by qualifying the restrictions with the
word 'reasonable'.
In the case of Bela Banerjee v. State ofW.B.,23 the Supreme Court expressed
the view that a law seeking to provide for the acquisition of private property for
public purpose had to provide for compensation which must be the just equivalent
of what the owner had been deprived of. As the decision was likely to lead to
impossible situations, the Constitution Fourth Amendment Act was enacted providing that no law providing for compulsory acquisition shall be called in question to
any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law was not
adequate. The amendment also provided that the law itself should provide for
compensation for the property and should either fix the amount of compensation or
specify the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation should
22 AIR 1950 SC 124.
23 AIR 1954 SC 170.
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be determined or given. However, the Supreme Court in Vajravelu and Metal Box
Company24 put a gloss on the amendment so as to nullify the effect of the amendment
by insisting that so long as the word "compensation" remained, its just equivalent
had to be paid. In 1969, the pendulum appeared to swing the other way in Shantilal's
case,24a but very soon again it appeared to swing back to Vajravelu in the Bank's
Nationalisation case.25
Very soon after the coming into force of the Constitution, a question arose
affecting personal liberty. A.K. Gopalan, a communist was detained without trial
under the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act with a view, it was said, to
prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the state and
the maintenance of public order. Gopalan claimed that the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Arts. 19 clauses (a) to (e) and (g) in general, and clause (d) in
particular, had been denied to him as the law providing for preventive detention did
not prescribe a fair procedure. His argument was that the provision of Art. 19 should
be read into the provisions of Arts. 21 and 22 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
held that Art. 22 of the Constitution was not controlled by Art. 19 and the validity
of a law providing for preventive detention could not be judged in the light of Art.
19(5) which enabled Parliament to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of
the fundamental rights guaranteed by clauses (d), (e) and (f).26 In other words, it was
held that the detenue could not claim procedural fairness as a fundamental right.
Thus, freedom was denied to the detenue, Gopalan the Communist. Years later the
question again came up for consideration as to whether the provisions of Art. 19
could be read into the other fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter III of the
ConstitutiOIi. This time, the right involved was the right to property and the Court
appeared to show a greater sensitivity, and going back upon its view in Gopalan's
case, held that a law providing for acquisition of property had to satisfy the
requirements of Art. 19 also in addition to the requirement of Art. 31.27 Thus
procedural fairness was secured and assured to the citizen. The principle of
procedural fairness was later affirmed repeatedly in Maneka Gandhi's28 case and
several other cases. However, 'procedural fairness' has again been dealt a severe
blow by the Court in Kartar Singh's29 case where the obnoxious provisions of the
T ADA Act have been upheld. It was heartening to note that the Chairman of the
National Human Rights Commission openly pleaded for the repeal of the TADA.
Though it was not repealed, it died a natural death on the expiry of the term for which
it was enacted.
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Two important amendments wbicb were both effected in 1971 were the 24th
and the 25th amendments. The 24th amendment was intended to eliminate the
miscbief of Golaknath wbile the 25th amendment was intended to nullify Vajravelu
and Metal Box Company. Tbe 24th amendment introduced a clause in Art. 13 to state
that nothing in Art. 13 shall apply to any amendment of the Constitution made under
Art. 368. Art. 368 itself was amended to specify the power of Parliament to amend
the Constitution as constituent power, making it clear that Art. 368 was not merely
procedural. Another clause was added to Art. 368 to empbasise that nothing in Art.
13 shall apply to any amendment made under Art. 368. The 25th amendment
dropped the word 'compensation' in Art. 31(2) and used in its place the word
'amount' thereby skirting round the interpretation put upon the word 'compensation'
by the Supreme Court that it had to be 'just equivalent'. The 25th amendment also
introduced Art. 31-C to provide that no law giving effect to the policy of the State
towards securing the directive principles specified in Art. 39 clause (b) or clause (c)
shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it was consistent with or took away
or abridged any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 or 31. It was also provided
that if the law contained a declaration that it was for giving effect to such policy of
the state it shall not be called in question on the ground that it did not give effect
to sucb policy. We may recall that Art. 39(b) refers to the distribution as best to
subserve the common good of ~e ownership and control of the material resources
of the community and Art. 39(c) refers to the operation of the economic system so
as not to result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the
common detriment.
The constitutional validity of the 24th and 25th amendments as well as the 29th
amendment (which included the Kerala Land Reforms Act in the IX Scbedule to the
Constitution) was questioned in Kesavananda Bharathi's case. I have already
mentioned Kesavananda Bharathi's case as baving overruled Golaknath but having
introduced the new concept of basic structure of the Constitution. In fact, in
Kesavananda Bharathi itself, the clause in Art. 31-C of the Constitution introduced
by the 25th amendment, that a declaration that a law was to give effect to the policy
of the state sball not be questioned in any Court on the ground that it did not give
effect to such a policy, was struck down as violative of the basic structure. The
judgment in KesavanandaBharathi was pronounced in 1973. The judgment led to
the suppression of three senior judges of the Supreme Court when the question of
appointing a successor to Chief Justice Sikri arose. The year 1973 was indeed a
watershed in the constitutional history of India. Until the year 1973 it looked as if
Parliament was asserting and consolidating its power as a democratic institution
committed to the goals of abolition of all semblance of feudalism, introduction of
land reforms and the pursuit of the directive principles of state policy mentioned in
Arts. 39(b) and (c). While the earlier constitutional amendments, that is, amendments up to 1973 were aimed at securing to Parliament the powers to legislate
without question in regard to the goals just mentioned, the amendments made
subsequently appear, as we shall presently see, to be aimed at securing more and
more power to the executive. The road signposts clearly changed from democracy
to authoritarianism.
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Emergency was declared in 1975. Came the Constitution 38th Amendment
making the satisfaction of the President with regard to the existence of circumstances
rendering it necessary to promulgate an ordinance final and conclusive and
nonjusticiable. Similarly, the satisfaction of the President in regard to proclamation
of emergency under Arts. 352 and 360 were also made final and conclusive and nonjusticiable. Then came the 39th Amendment to undo the decision of the Allahabad
High Court which had set aside the election of Mrs. Gandhi who was then the Prime
Minister of the country. This constitutional amendment provided that no election to
either house of Parliament of person who held the office of Prime Minister at the
time of such election or who wl,ls appointed as Prime Minister after such election
shall be called in question except before the authority or body and in such a manner
as may be prescribed by law made by Parliament. The election of such person was
thus removed from the purview of the courts who had otherwise jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the validity of such election. It was further declared that no law
made by Parliament before the commencement of the 39th amendment in so far as
it related to election petitions and matters connected therewith shall apply or shall
be deemed ever to have applied to or in relation to the election of any person who
was Prime Minister and such election shall not deemed to be void before such
commencement and that notwithstanding any order made by any Court such election
shall continue to be valid in all respectS and any finding on which such order was
based shall be deemed to have always been void and of no effect. The amendment
was blatantly perverse and an outrageous attempt not merely to overrule the
judgment of the Allahabad High Court, but to immunise the election of a single
individual namely Mrs. Gandhi. Perhaps it was the grossest abuse of power in any
country claiming to be wedded to Parliamentary Democracy.
In 1976 came the notorious 42nd Amendment. By the 42nd Amendment, the
words 'Socialist' and 'Secular'. were added to 'Sovereign' and 'Democratic' in the
Preamble, as also the word 'Integrity' to the word 'Unity' also in the Preamble. Art.
31-C which was introduced by the 25th Amendment was further widened so as to
cover laws made to secure all or any of the Directive Principles of state policy and
not confined to Arts. 39-B and 39-C. New Directive Principles, Arts. 39-A and 48A to secure equal opportunities for justice and free legal aid, participation of workers
in the management of industry and the protection and improvement of environment
and the safeguarding of forests and wildlife were added. A whole pretentious new
chapter Part IV-A setting out 'Fundamental Duties' was also added. So much was
perhaps to the good. But it was all sheer veneer. The rest and indeed most of the 42nd
Amendment was nothing but hard blackness. Art. 31-D was added to provide
immunity to all laws made for prevention or p'rohibition of so called anti-national
association. The expressions, associations and anti-national activity were also
defined and defined so widely that any individual or association could be branded
as anti-national and all democratic dissent could be suppressed on that ground and
sycophancy would be patented as patriotism. The jurisdiction and powers of the
Supreme Court and High Courts were severely curtailed. The Supreme Court was
barred from adj udicating on the vires of Central Acts. No legislation could be struck
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down except by a two-third majority of the judges. Art. 226 which gave writ
jurisdiction to the High Court was totally mutilated. The words 'for any other
purpose' were deleted making it impossible for a citizen to protect himself against
arbitrary acts of the Executive. Opportunities for justice were to be denied while in
the same breath Art. 43-A was pretentiously introduced as a directive principle to
provide for easy access to justice. Art. 311 was amended to deny a s~cond
opportunity against punishment to a civil servant. Other articles of the Constitution
were amended to give wider power to the Executive in the matter of issuing
proclamations of emergency. Finally, the amending provisions Art. 368 was itself
amended and it was provided that no amendment of the Constitution shall be called
in question in any court and that there shall be no limitation on the Constituent power
of Parliament to amend the Constitution under that Article.
The executive government was not content with the suppression of the three
senior judges of the Supreme Court in the matter of appointment of Chief Justice.
The judiciary as an institution had to be kept under the thumb. So the policy of
transfer of Judges was evolved and fourteen hand-picked High Court judges were
transferred. Though in the first Judges' case, S.P. Gupta v. Union of India,3D the
Court surrendered and virtually abdicated its powers, in the recent Judges cases,
Supreme Court Advocates on Record Assn. v. Union of India,31 the Court has
asserted itself and wrested back-the powers from the executive. But the poisonous
seed sown at the time of the initial transfer of judges appears to have taken root and
the disastrous policy of transfer of judges is being continued. The executive itself
could not have done more to shake the confidence of the public in the judiciary than
the present policy of wholesale transfer of judges pursued by the Supreme Court.
The bureaucracy, permanent and political, must be gloating over this sad and
distressing grievous injury inflicted on the judiciary by itself, by the Chief Justice
of India and his colleagues. It is one thing to vest the power of transfer in the Chief
Justice of India, but an altogether different thing to make transfer of judges a policy.
Two or three years back, there was a massive transfer of judges and the announcement in the newspapers read like the postings of subordinate civil servants like
Tahsildars, sub-registrars. By one stroke of the pen, the position of the High Court
judges appears to have been reduced to that of subordinate civil servants and their
office was stripped of the dignity and prestige which they had earlier.
With the declaration of the Emergency and the passing of the 42nd Amendment, the Supreme Court appeared to lose its nerve, as it were. Until then, whenever
individual rights were involved, particularly rights involving property, the Supreme
Court was asserting its 'independence', sometimes without regard of consequences
to the people. The doctrines of ultra vires and natural justice had been well nourished
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vide - Barium Chemicals, 32 AX Kraipak, 33 Anglo-Afghan34 Agencies. Even in cases
involving personal liberty, though it had denied liberty to Gopalan, the Court had
later built up a great jurisprudence of habeas corpus which insisted that even if one
out of several grounds of detention was bad for vagueness or other reason, the order
of detention would be quashed. But during the Emergency, all was abandoned and
the Court in Shivkanth Shukla's35 case virtually held that no one had an inherent right
to life and liberty and that life and liberty were mere bounties of the state. The 'Court
ceased to be a bulwark of a citizen's life and liberty, and it looked as if the reason
for the existence of the Supreme Court as the protector of the people against despotic
injustice also ceased to exist. In Shivakanth Shukla, the Supreme Court sank to the
lowest depths. The Court has much to atone for. But there was a faint glimmer of
hope when the court in Mrs. Gandhi's case, while upholding the election on the
ground that the reasons for setting aside the election were no longer valid in view
of the amendments to the Representation of the Peoples Act nevertheless struck
down the amendments to the Constitution which immunised the election on the
ground that they offended the basic structure of the Constitution.
Let down by the courts, the people themselves stood for democracy and
showed the door to authoritarian forces in 1977. The new Parliament by the 43rd
and 44th Amendments undid to a large extent the mischief of the 38th and 42nd
Amendments. In regard to proclamations of Emergency, several safeguards were
additionally provided, one of the safeguards was that no proclamation of Emergency
could be issued, unless the decision of the Union Cabinet was conveyed in writing
to the President. The approval of the proclamation by Parliament could only be by
a majority of the total membership of each House and by a majority of not less than
two-thirds of the members of the House present and voting. Another important
provision was that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 20 and 21 could not
be suspended under any circumstances, thus undoing the harm done by Shivakanth
Shukla's case.
The most significant change brought about by the 44th amendment was the
abolition of the right to property as a fundamental right and its removal to Part XII
of the Constitution. We may recall that much of the constitutional litigation of the
first two decades of the Constitution was the product of the fundamental rights to
property. Another important amendment was the substitution of a new clause 4 for
the old clause 4(a) of Art. 22 of the Constitution providing for the Constitution of
an Advisory Board in accordance with the recommendations of the Chief Justice of
the appropriate High Court This amendment was to take effect on a date to be
prescribed by the Government. Soon after the amendment was passed, the Government which was responsible for the amendment fell, and Mrs. Gandhi came back

32 Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board, AIR 1967
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Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 see 262.
34 Union of India v. Anglo-Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 se 718.
35 A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkanth Shukla, (1976) 2 see 521.
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to power. As yet no date has been fixed for amendment to take effect. The result is
that a Constitutional Amendment has been practically nullified by the Executive
Government for a'decade.
'
With the lifting of the Emergency and the ending of the eclipse of democracy,
the style of functioning of the Supreme Court also visibly changed. The Court
appeared to show greater concern for the problems of the ordinary people and
became more concerned with real practical justice than abstract legal justice. It was
ready to evolve new jurisprudential rules and invent new techniques. Foremost is the
concept of Public Interest Litigation, the foundation for which was laid down by the
genius Justice Krishna Iyer in the Rat/am Municipality36 case. The concept has
grown from strength to strength and the Court, in pursuit of the rights to equality
and life, is willing to be involved in the problems of pavement dwellers, retrenched
employees, unemployed unfortunates, victims of poison, pollution, flood and
d~vastation, destitute women, bonded labour, prisoners, problems of education,
sanitation, environment, any problem of public interest. Oxbridge was furious. They
found it difficult to swallow this bit of 'native jurisprudence'. An ex-Chief Justice
then holding a high political office burst out with what he intended to be heavy
sarcasm, "public interest litigation has limitless fields which have not been surveyed
and reported to the Court. Pavement dwellers, insanitary or dangerous structures,
garbage, pollution, disease, poverty, unemployment, failure of educational policy,
bank robberies, broad daylight murders, deaths caused by hooch, food poisoning,
overturning of overloaded boats, falling of buses in khuds, railway accidents to name
only a few, they will be subject for special attention of lawyers and judges involved
in 'public interest litigation'," To answer in the same sarcastic strain, I may continue,
the learned ex-Chief Justice is quite right. The courts have no business to concern
themselves with the misfortune of the miserable wretches when there were palace
and mansion dwellers, huge multi-storied apartment builders, corporate giants,
corporate wars, take-over battles, inside fights for supremacy, intricate problems of
tax evasion, or should I say tax-avoidance lest I annoy/offend Me. Palkhiwala and
other tax lawyers, sugar barons etc., all of whose civil rights and liberties have of
course to be carefully protected, so much for the Indian Oxbridge.
Right to equality was interpreted in Maneka Gandhi, Royappa,37 International
Airport Authority, 38 Ajay Hasia39 and a host of other cases to include a right against
all arbitrary action. It was held that the doctrine of classification was not the
objective or end of Art. 14 and that reasonableness was an essential element of
equality. Equality necessarily excluded arbitrary action and Art. 14 was a guarantee
against arbitrariness. Earlier, in interpreting Art. 14 of the Constitution, instead of
adopting the positive, broader egalitarianism of the Directive Principles, aiming at
36 Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardichand, (1980) 4
37 E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4
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the elimination of the conditions creating inequality and thereby fostering real
equality, the Court turned to the American experience for guidance and adopted the
narrow, negative principle that, what was forbidden was class legislation and not
classification. If the classification was based on intelligible differentiation and had
a rational relation to the subject of the statute, that was sufficient. In the cases of
Sanjeev Coke and Nakara,4o the Court opted for the broader egalitarianism of the
formal equality. In Nakara, lakhs of retired Government employees were benefited
by the Court. Justice D.A. Desai speaking for it, striking down the choice of a date
for giving the benefit of a liberalised pension scheme held that all pensioners were
entitled to receive those benefits. Justice Desai, in several other cases, redefined the
approach to problems of labour and industrial relations by introducing a refreshingly
new outlook. In Randhir Singh,41 the principle of equal pay for equal work was
judicially propounded for the first time. In Ramashankar Raghuvanshi,42 the insidious advance of M. Carthyism in India was attempted to be stopped and it was held
that public employment cannot be denied to a person because he does not share the
views of those in power or because of his political beliefs and past political
affiliations. In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala,43 the Court set aside the order
of expulsion of three school children who had b~en expelled for not singing the
national anthem and upheld their right to freedom of speech (including that of
remaining silent) and freedom of faith. In the McDowell case,44 a Constitution Bench
of Five Judges ruled that there would now be no judicial blessing to tax avoidance
projects. A whole new prison jurisprudence was authored by Krishna Iyer J. In the
domains of natural justice, ultra vires and labour law the Supreme Court has rendered
unnameable judg~ents of which liberal lawyers throughout the world may feeljustly
proud. There was a great insistence on the principle of audi alteram partem and on
the requirement ;)f reasons.45 It was held that failure to obse(Ve natural justice was
itself prejudicial and if no reason were given, it would be presumed that there were
no reasons to be given; if reasons were given they had to be relevant. But the greatest
advances have been in the field of Public Interest Litigation and the interpretation
of the right to life. Right to life has been interpreted in Bandhua Mukti Morcha,46
and other cases to mean the right to live with human dignity free from exploitation
and to include the livelihood, protection of the health and strength of workers, men
and women, and children of tender age against abuse, opportunities for children to
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, etc. The right
to a speedy trial,47 the right to privacy, even that of a woman of easy virtue,48 the
40 D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 1 see 305.
41 Randhir Sin8.h v. Union of India, (1982) 1 see 618.
42 State of M.P. v. Ramashankar Raghuvanshi, (1983) 2
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43 (1986) 3 see 615.
44 McDowell Co. Ltd. v. CTO, (1985) 3 see 230.
45 SL Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 see 379.
46 Bandhua Mukthi Morcha v. Union of India, AIR 1984 se 802.
47 A.R. Antuwy v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 see 225.
48 State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Mardikar, (1991) 1 see 87.
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right to work within the limitations of economic capacity and development, 49 the
right to free education upto the age of 14 years and thereafter according to the
economic capacity and development of the state have been held to be included in
the right to life. In the last two cases, the Supreme Court has used the directive
principles 'to control the right to life under Art. 21.
Meanwhile, within a decade after 1977, the lessons of 1977 appeared to be
forgotten. Once again, authoritarianism started raising its ugly head. The Constitution was once more amended, this time to provide for a special Presidential
notification of Emergency in the case of internal disturbances suspending within the
State of Punjab, the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 19 and 21 with no right
to the citizen to approach a Court even in cases of gross injustice or abuse. The
amendment was mischievous and struck at the roots of democracy. What was also
very disturbing was the manner in which the constitutional provision requiring a
two-third majority of the members of each House to vote in favour of the amendment
was circumvented by rushing the Bill through the Rajya Sabha after the notification
for the biennial elections to that House had been issued. The government then in
power obviously apprehended that after the elections they would not have the
requisite majority in the house and the bill would not be passed. So the will of the
people was forestalled by hurrying with the amendment, a procedure which was both
undemocratic and unethical. It was a clear signal for authoritarianism. This was the
59th Constitutional amendment. Thereafter the Constitution was again sought to be
amended on the ostensible pretext of transferring power to Panchayat Raj institutions. There was much good in the proposal but it was also an attempt to by-pass
the States and the motives were clearly suspect. Any way, the amendment was
thrown out. Once again the people asserted themselves. The authoritarian signals
were noticed and the party in power was voted out. But apparently the people were
not willing to give a massive mandate to anyone or entrust power to any single party.
The new government headed by Sri Y.P. Singh was able to get the 59th Amendment
repealed. Mr. Singh was soon thrown out of power and was succeeded by Sri
Chandrasekbar, who too met a similar fate. There were fresh elections to the Lok
Sabha, and Sri P.Y. Narasimha Rao of the Congress (I) was installed as Prime
Minister with a precarious majority. As a step towards decentralisation and the
establishment of Panchayat Raj, in pursuance of the directive principles in Articles
of the Constitution, the Constitution (seventy third) Amendment Act has been
passed. The powers and authority of the Panchayat Institutions proposed by the
Constitutional Amendment have to be defined by the legislatures of the various
states. It remains to be seen whether these Panchayat Institutions are going to make
any dent in the present power structure where the rural elite have till now been unable
to capture all the benefits of economic and political power. If that happens and the
apparatus of State power at the Panchayat level is shared by all sections of the
community, it will be an excellent beginning for the sharing of power at all levels
of Government. But all the signals seem to point the other way. I am a great optimist
49 Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union v. Delhi Admn., (1992) 4
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The most recent of the Constitutional Amendments is the inclusion of the
Tamil Nadu Act regarding Reservations in the IX Schedule. The amendment is
aimed at circumventing the decision of the Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme
Court in lndra Sawhney's case prescribing the 50% limit for reservations. The
Constitutional amendment was passed without discussion supported by all parties
vying with each other to pose as the champions of the backward classes. We may
now expect the Legislatures of other States to enact similar laws and demand their
inclusion in the Ninth Schedule.
In the world outside India tremendous changes have taken place. The socialist
countries of Russia and Eastern Europe have abandoned socialism and opted for
laissez faire. It is neither the United Nations Charter, nor the UN convenants and
conventions, but the International Trade Agreement (the successor of GAIT) that
is the charter for world government and its administrator is the World Trade
Organisation. Not the Parliaments of the world, but the multinational corporations
have emerged as the real rulers of the world. India has followed suit. The Government of India, without so much as a 'by your leave' to Parliament, have committed
India to the Agreement ignoring our Constitution and our laws. But signing the
agreement was only the last step. The process had began earlier, progressively with
liberalisation, privatisation and denationalisation. Bureaucracy's role in the sorry
story will have to be explored and perhaps exposed some day. While such momentous changes affecting the social, economic and political life of our country were
taking place, courts and judges were kept busy with questions like admission of
professional colleges, reservations, executive patronages, seniority of civil servants,
quotas under licence, etc. The Judges themselves appeared to become unsure of the
ends and the means. The court's vacillation and hesitancy, and its readiness to accept
the empty assurances of the Narasimha Rao Government contributed to some extent,
to the disaster of Babri Masjid. The Court claimed to itself, the right of judicial
review over the political proce"ss of impeachment of a judge while it excluded
judicial review in the matter of appointment and transfer of judges. In regressing
impliedly on a nine-judge Bench has said about 'Secularism' expounded its own
philosophy of Iiindutva (which it should never have done) and credited the particular
political party with it. When there was considerable criticism, the Court sought to
explain away its judgment. This period of seeming self-contradiction and irresolution was short-lived. Soon the Court emerged strong and self-confident. In the field
of Constitutional law, in Bommai's case, the Supreme Court was practically unanimous that a Presidential proclamation under Art. 356(1) was amenable to judicial
review, though there was a lack of unanimity on the extent of such judicial review.
The Court was also unanimous that Secularism was a basic feature of the Constitution and that violation of such a basic feature was a valid ground for the exercise
of the power under Art. 356. In the fields of public law, administrative law and
environmental law, vast advances have been made, thanks to public interest litigation and judicial activism. With Justice Verma at the forefront, the Court has been
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waging a Constitutional war against corruption in high places, a cancer affecting the
country's polity. The executive was never really interested in fighting corruption
since tbey were themselves deeply involved. Tbe police, tied to the apron strings of
the political executive, was always acting under their contro!. Tben came the
revelation of the Havala case, J.M.M. MPs case and a host of other cases of
corruption involving the highest state dignitaries and functionaries. The CBI was
loath to take action, but the Supreme Court came to the rescue of the nation by telling
the CB I where their duty lay and literally pushed them into action in accordance with
law and allow 'law to take its course'! Justice Kuldip Singh and his colleagues in
the cases of Capt. Satish Sharma and Smt. Sheila Kaul held that where openness,
transparency and fair dealing were lacking and there was abuse of power for
extraneous reasons, the authorities concerned, Minister or otherwise, would expose
themselves to appropriate penalties at the hands of the Courts. While on the one
hand, the Court has been trying to clean public life, on the other hand, the Court
consisting of Justice Kuldip Singh and others have been trying to cleanse the
environment. If the generations to come find the waters of the Ganga and the
Yamuna and other rivers once again clean and the atmosphere of Delhi, Cawnpore
and other industrial towns free from pollution, it would be due to the Herculean
efforts of Justice Kuldip Singh and his colleagues.
Now-a-days, we hear a lot of talk about judicial activism. On the one hand
some members of the civil and the political executive are highly critical of what they
describe as the usurpation of the powers of the executive by the judiciary. They feel
that the judges have installed themselves as the rulers though they have no
conception of the colossal nature of the economic, political and administrative
problems facing the country and the people, and are least equipped to deal with those
problems. On the other hand, there is a general consensus among common people
that the judiciary is the only institution that is still functioning and making
democracy tick in this country. Without the judiciary they feel, there is no institutional integrity and decency left in the country.
Whatever others may say, those of the legal fraternity consisting of judges,
lawyers and law-academics, know that judges are far from desirous of establishing
an oligarchy of judges. All that they are really interested in and trying to do, is to
uphold the Constitution and the laws which is part of their oath of office. Whenever
the State, its functionaries or its instrumentations fail to discharge their Constitutional and legal obligations, it again becomes the duty of the Courts to give
appropriate directions to make them discharge such obligations. Where traditional
procedures and rusty rules of interpretation are unable to meet the demands of a new
or strange situations, the Court is bound to innovate new procedures and invent new
principles of interpretation. Judicial activism is no more and no less than that and
it has always been there. Judicial activism has hit the headlines now because
executive transgressions of the Constitution and the laws have become rampant and
executive failure to discharge constitutional and legal obligations have become more
frequent. The greater the volume and the content of such transgressions and failures,
the greater the necessity and the scope for judicial activism. Judges are not interested
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in taking over the reins of government. They know their limitations and frequently
admonish and remind themselves that judicial restraint should always go hand-inhand with judicial activism.
To those that complain of judicial activism, I say, 'Mend your ways and put
your house in order, there won't be any occasion for judicial activism'.
Forty six years have passed since the Constitution came into force. There have
been many highs and lows in the Court's functioning in the discharge of its
constitutional obligations. By and large, its performance has been creditworthy.
Some of its pronouncements are worthy of the highest traditions of the highest court
of any country, and are bound to warm the hearts of the liberal minded all the world
over. The Judiciary has shown far greater sensitivity than the other two organs of
the State and, in the last decade, it has shown itself to be a pathfinder seeking
discovery of ways and means to translate into workday realism, the Constitutional
philosophy of transforming society into a just, free and equal society. My good
wishes to the Courts for better and better functioning, and my good wishes to all of
you for the New Year with a request to pardon me for my several shortcomings.

